Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), by which the Council requested me to report to it every three months on the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, the status of refugees and internally displaced persons, progress made in creating security conditions conducive to their voluntary return, and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). The present report covers major developments since my last report, dated 8 July 2008 (S/2008/444), and includes the findings of the United Nations-European Union midterm review of the implementation of resolution 1778 (2007) and recommendations for arrangements following the end of the mandate of the European Union-led military force in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR).

II. Developments in Chad

A. Political

2. Some progress was achieved during the reporting period in regard to the 13 August 2007 agreement on electoral reforms. On 2 July, the Ministry of Economy and Planning commenced a cartographic census, which is to be completed in early 2009 and will be followed by a demographic census. The results of the cartographic census will be used to update the voter registration list. On 16 July, eight additional political parties signed the 13 August agreement, bringing the total number of signatory parties to 91 out of 101 registered political parties in Chad. Five of the new signatory parties belong to the presidential majority, while three belong to opposition parties.

3. The Committee established to follow up the implementation of the 13 August agreement continued to meet. In June, the Committee submitted to the Government draft bills on the electoral law and the establishment of the independent electoral commission. The Government has yet to approve the drafts and submit them to the Parliament for its consideration. The Committee’s sensitization programme on
electoral reforms has not yet been implemented owing to an absence of contacts with relevant parties, including women’s and youth groups.

4. Progress in the implementation of the Sirte agreement signed on 25 October 2007 by the Government of Chad and the main Chadian armed opposition groups (CAOGs), including the Union des forces pour le développement et la démocratie (UFDD), the Rassemblement des forces pour le changement (RFC) and the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement fondamental (UFDDF), remains limited. The parties agreed to respect the constitution, cease fighting, grant amnesty to the rebels, allow rebel groups to participate in the running of state affairs, integrate rebel forces into the Chadian national army and hold another meeting in Tripoli, including all political parties and relevant civil society organizations, to follow up on the implementation of the Sirte agreement.

5. On 18 August, the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya brokered an agreement between the Government of Chad and RFC dissidents under which the latter signed the Sirte agreement. As a result, some 50 former RFC fighters will be integrated into the national security forces. Despite progress on this front, on 14 August, the Mouvement pour la justice et la démocratie au Tchad (MDJT), an armed group from the northern part of the country, joined the Alliance Nationale led by the UFDD leader, Mahamat Nouri. On 16 August, Timan Erdimi, the leader of RFC, reportedly announced that contacts were under way with other armed opposition groups to reinforce the Alliance’s military capacity.

6. On 17 July, the contact group established under the Dakar accord met in Dakar. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan informed the contact group that his Government would resume diplomatic relations with Chad. The Minister for External Relations of Chad took note of the declaration. On 1 August, the Libyan Minister for African Affairs visited N’Djamena and urged the President, Idriss Deby, to resume diplomatic ties with the Sudan. The following day, the Chadian Minister for External Relations announced that the Government had accepted the Libyan proposal. On 2 August, the Minister for External Relations of Chad stated that President Al-Bashir had instructed Sudanese diplomats to return to N’Djamena to reopen the embassy. As of 31 August, however, the exchange of ambassadors had not taken place.

7. At its ninth regular session, held in Yaoundé, on 24 and 25 June 2008, the Conference of Heads of State of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa strongly condemned repeated rebel attacks and attempts to destabilize Chad. The Heads of State appealed to the Security Council to do everything possible to help resolve the Darfur crisis and its destabilizing effects on neighbouring countries.

8. On 5 August, the National Commission of Inquiry, established on 2 April to look into the early February 2008 events in N’Djamena, submitted its report to the President. The report was released on 3 September. Its main findings indicated that both rebel groups and the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) were responsible for violating human rights during the events, including through arbitrary execution, torture, rape and the disproportionate use of force. The report also noted that freedom of the press had been temporarily restricted and that little action had been taken to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and criminal acts committed during the events. The Commission recommended the establishment of a committee, to include the international community, to follow up its findings and recommendations.
9. On 7 and 8 August, an informal round table organized by MINURCAT and hosted by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs took place in Stockholm, bringing together over 30 representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, EUFOR, the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Francophonie and the Governments of Chad, Austria, Canada, China, the Congo, France, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Participants expressed appreciation of the Dakar process as a valuable regional peace initiative, underlined the urgent need for improved security conditions in eastern Chad and welcomed the deployment of the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS).

10. On 15 August, a Chadian court sentenced former President Hissène Habré to death in absentia for allegedly providing “financial, material and moral support” to rebels who attacked the capital in February 2008. Eleven rebel leaders involved in the February attacks were also sentenced to death in absentia.

B. Security

11. The security situation, particularly in eastern Chad, remains volatile. Heavy rains and poor infrastructure blocked movement during the reporting period, and a decrease in the number of skirmishes between the FANT and armed opposition groups was observed.

12. Carjacking, armed robberies and crime targeting national and international humanitarian staff continued during the reporting period. On 7 July, a group of armed men in military uniform forcibly entered the Oxfam compound in Kerfi (45 kms south-east of Goz Beida) and fired about 14 shots. While all civilians escaped unharmed, the compound was damaged. On 8 July, a group of unidentified young men broke into the facilities of International Relief and Development and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Kerfi. The cause of these attacks is unknown, but presumed to be banditry. All humanitarian relief workers deployed to Kerfi were relocated to Goz Beida. On 10 July, Oxfam, which provides water and sanitation to over 11,000 people in Kerfi, and MSF, which provides vital health services, temporarily suspended their activities in the town. To date, only essential activities (water and health care) are maintained in the area.

13. On 26 July, two unidentified armed persons shot at two International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicles about 100 metres from the ICRC compound in Abéché. One international staff person who was seriously injured was transferred to the EUFOR hospital in Abéché for surgery and subsequently evacuated to Europe. On 5 August, an MSF staff member was attacked and stabbed several times in N’Djamena. The attacker was arrested on the spot.

C. Humanitarian situation

14. Eastern Chad currently hosts over 290,000 refugees and more than 180,000 internally displaced persons, who continue to rely on humanitarian aid for their survival. Up to 700,000 individuals among the host communities are also estimated to have humanitarian needs. The security situation continues to seriously undermine the capacity of humanitarian workers to deliver assistance. Over $1.5 million worth of non-food items and vehicles were lost during the 15 June attacks by armed
opposition groups in eastern Chad. Insecure conditions have compelled humanitarian workers to apply more rigorous and restrictive security measures.

15. Protection issues continue to be of great concern. Vulnerable groups, particularly women and children, are often the target of attacks by armed elements. Refugee camps in eastern Chad have become increasingly militarized. It has been reported that displaced persons sites and local villages have been targeted for forced recruitment.

16. Investigations into criminal acts by the local authorities, if they take place at all, are usually not completed. Since the attack on its staff member on 26 July, ICRC has suspended its activities in displaced persons sites pending an investigation into the incident by national authorities.

17. The rainy season has hindered humanitarian access to some locations in eastern Chad. Koukou, in Dar Sila, which is host to some 60,000 internally displaced persons and refugees, has become virtually isolated due to impassable roads. MINURCAT has assisted the humanitarian community in providing logistical air support for the provision of life-saving assistance. Torrential rains at the end of July and early August resulted in the loss of lives and flooding of houses and infrastructure.

18. While the security situation is not conducive to the sustainable return of the displaced population in eastern Chad, limited spontaneous movements have been reported. Up to half of the internally displaced have left sites in Arkoum and Goudiang in the Ouaddai region, while in Dar Sila several thousand have returned to their villages of origin to harvest their crops prior to the rainy season.

19. On 25 July, at a meeting of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator, humanitarian actors in eastern Chad voiced serious concern at the limited action taken by the Government against perpetrators of criminal acts including death threats, harassment, intimidation, theft and car hijacking. This has severely limited the delivery of humanitarian assistance in many parts of eastern Chad.

III. Developments in the Central African Republic

20. In the Central African Republic, a comprehensive peace accord was signed on 21 June between the Government and the rebel groups of the Armée pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (APRD) and the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR). On 9 July, the Government announced that the armed groups that had not signed the agreement, including the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC) and the Union des forces républicaines (UFR), were ready to sign it in Tripoli between 21 and 23 July. The signing ceremony was postponed owing to a contentious article on the promulgation of an amnesty law for crimes and offences committed by APRD, FDPC and UFDR.

21. On 12 July, the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (FOMUC) transferred its operational responsibility to the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace (MICOPAX) under the authority of the Economic Community of Central African States. This peacebuilding mission, in addition to having combat troops, police and gendarmes, will incorporate a civilian branch which is intended to help revive political dialogue.
IV. Implementation of the Mission’s mandate

22. As of 25 August, the strength of MINURCAT stood at 724, including 200 United Nations police officers and 38 military liaison officers. The Mission is currently deployed in N’Djamena, Abéché and Bangui. Deployment to Goz Beida, Farchana and Birao has started and is currently ongoing. The MINURCAT Police Commissioner, Major General Gerardo Chaumont (Argentina), took up his duties in Chad on 9 August.

A. Police

23. During the reporting period, MINURCAT rehabilitated the DIS training centre at the National Police Academy and conducted a training course for 231 DIS elements, which ended on 4 August. The total number of trained DIS officers now stands at 324. The selection of the second class of officers to be trained is ongoing. So far 152 gendarmes have been selected, including 135 currently working with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) under the National Commission for Aid to Refugees.

24. The memorandum of understanding between the Government and MINURCAT on United Nations support for DIS was signed in N’Djamena on 14 August. A presidential decree officially establishing DIS should be issued shortly. Thereafter, and pending improvements in logistical support, the first batch of 100 DIS officers will be deployed to Abéché, Farchana and Goz Beida, the DIS senior command will be appointed and specific assignments of the 71 DIS commanders clearly defined.

25. In Abéché, United Nations police officers conducted foot and mobile patrols to liaise with the population and national counterparts. MINURCAT police and judicial officers have conducted sensitization meetings in eastern Chad, in coordination with local prosecutors, to enhance awareness of the mandate of MINURCAT and DIS activities. Coordination mechanisms between DIS and other law enforcement agencies, including the Garde nomade, local police and gendarmerie, have been developed to facilitate law and order operations.

26. In the Central African Republic, MINURCAT, in coordination with the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (BONUCA), liaises on a regular basis with police authorities in Bangui to provide technical advice on ways to strengthen law enforcement in the north-eastern part of the country. One United Nations police officer has been deployed to Birao to liaise with local authorities and law enforcement entities.

B. Justice and corrections

27. During the reporting period, the MINURCAT judicial advisory and corrections units continued to establish relations with national counterparts. Based on the recommendations of the inter-agency justice and corrections planning mission, led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, MINURCAT will focus its justice activities on support for the implementation of the DIS concept of operations through the development of a tracking mechanism for arrests and detentions; support for strengthening judicial institutions and the harmonization of traditional
justice with the modern judicial system; and the facilitation of access to justice for all, with a focus on vulnerable groups.

28. During the reporting period, four needs assessments were carried out in Abéché, Goz Beida and N’Djamena prisons. In collaboration with the gender unit, the corrections unit advised and facilitated medical service delivery for expectant and nursing mothers in custody; provided advice on classification and accommodation mechanisms applicable to both sexes and on the management of homosexual persons in custody; collaborated with the Ministry of Social Affairs on juvenile issues; and assisted in the development of reintegration programmes for women and juveniles in custody.

C. Civil affairs

29. During the reporting period, MINURCAT strengthened its political and civil affairs presence in the field, particularly in Abéché, and made several field visits to Farchana, Iriba and Goz Beida. Concerns raised by the local population during these visits include access to basic community services (health, education, water and cultivable land), peaceful cohabitation between internally displaced and host communities, integration of the internally displaced in host communities, and access to community services in villages of origin, prior to return. The Mission will follow up on these issues with local authorities and communities.

30. On 14 August, MINURCAT initiated a high-level visit to Kerfi with the Governor of the region of Dar Sila, and representatives of the Coordination nationale d’appui à la force internationale au Tchad (CONAFIT), United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. The team met with local authorities and representatives to assess the situation following inter-ethnic clashes on 8 July 2008. As a result of the visit, leaders of the Mouro and Dadjo ethnic groups, which participated in the July clashes, agreed to work together in developing the region. In this regard, MINURCAT will implement a quick-impact project in the region to support community reconciliation activities.

31. Four quick-impact projects are being developed in the following areas: road construction to support the return of internally displaced persons, agricultural kits for displaced persons returning to home villages, construction of a cereal mill to benefit vulnerable populations, and access for refugee and displaced women to radio broadcasts designed to help improve their living conditions. The projects will be implemented in association with United Nations partners and non-governmental organizations.

32. During the period under review, MINURCAT strengthened its collaboration with non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies in the field, in particular UNHCR in refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites, to facilitate intercommunal dialogue. MINURCAT is also working with CONAFIT on the implementation of an Agence française de développement programme on intercommunal dialogue and with the European Union in the framework of the Programme d’assistance et d’accompagnement à la stabilisation à l’est du Tchad. The two programmes will include a total investment of 20 million euros during a three-year period.
D. Human rights

33. The overall human rights situation remains a concern, particularly in regard to impunity and sexual violence. Reports have been received of arbitrary killings and extrajudicial executions committed by government, rebel and unidentified armed elements. MINURCAT has also received reports of rape and other forms of gender-based violence perpetrated by armed elements in internally displaced persons sites, refugee camps and surrounding villages. The victims are sometimes as young as 11 years old. Little or no action has been taken by the authorities to hold perpetrators accountable.

34. With support from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and in collaboration with national partners, MINURCAT is taking steps to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights in eastern Chad. MINURCAT participated in a workshop convened by the Ministry of Human Rights and Civil Liberties on the validation of the terms of reference for a national forum on human rights, with a view to generating a national action plan for the promotion and protection of human rights. MINURCAT will support the implementation of the plan. MINURCAT has also conducted several joint field visits with the Ministry of Human Rights to strengthen collaboration with local authorities.

35. On 23 August, senior MINURCAT personnel accompanied the Minister for Human Rights to the internally displaced persons site of Arkoum located in the Ouaddai region near the border with the Sudan, where the Minister witnessed first-hand the situation of internally displaced persons. She promised to bring her field assessment to the attention of President Deby and to enhance her Ministry’s efforts to find a lasting solution to the problems of the country’s internally displaced persons.

E. Humanitarian liaison

36. During the reporting period, the Mission worked closely with United Nations agencies, programmes and funds and other partners through its humanitarian liaison unit to share information, tools and expertise with the international community, including non-governmental partners, to achieve common goals and enlarge humanitarian space.

37. From 5 to 7 August, within the framework of the protection of civilians, MINURCAT and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs organized civil-military workshops in Goz Beida and Farchana to improve information-sharing and coordination between the humanitarian community, MINURCAT and EUFOR.

F. Gender

38. During the period under review, MINURCAT strengthened its coordination mechanisms with all relevant ministries in Chad to increase the number of women involved in security matters, especially with regard to the protection of women and children in refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites.
39. Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) reinforce the responsibility of peacekeepers to prevent and combat violence against women. MINURCAT has undertaken a number of sensitization activities to combat violence against women and girls, especially with regard to their protection in refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites.

40. Sensitization activities on resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) were also conducted in early August for civil society organizations, local authorities and law enforcement agencies to promote a deeper understanding of the resolutions and to inform all actors involved of the mandate of MINURCAT. The Mission has also drafted a code of conduct with respect to the prevention of gender-based violence and resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). Town hall meetings were convened to disseminate and address the main principles enshrined in the code of conduct.

41. MINURCAT has also trained DIS on issues related to gender-based violence to enhance its capacity to protect women and children in refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites. Tools to track and record incidents of gender-based violence have been developed. Over 50 women from civil society organizations have been trained in the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence to enable them to react effectively to the needs of battered women and survivors of sexual abuse in the camps.

G. Mission support

42. During the reporting period, MINURCAT increased its capacity to deploy its personnel to the east by constructing accommodation and working space using its own resources and renting premises for this purpose. This has enabled the additional deployment of personnel, particularly in Abéché.

43. A commercial camp construction contract was signed on 30 July with an international contractor. The deployment of the contractor is expected to be completed by the end of September.

44. The extreme operating conditions outside N’Djamena, including limited local infrastructure, poor roads and the security environment, continue to affect the deployment of MINURCAT personnel. Moreover, the rainy season has caused logistical difficulties in the construction of sites and deployment of personnel.

H. Safety and security

45. During the reporting period, the security phase remained at IV in northern and eastern Chad and III in the capital and southern areas. The security phase in eastern Chad is at phase IV due to continued border tensions and banditry.

46. Security awareness is being reinforced in close cooperation with Chadian authorities and EUFOR. The security management programme is being reviewed to reflect EUFOR support for security and protection.
I. Military liaison

47. To date, MINURCAT has deployed 38 military liaison officers within the area of responsibility, including Farchana, Goz Beida, N’Djamena and Birao. During the reporting period, these officers strengthened their cooperation with EUFOR, particularly in regard to the exchange of information to build common situational awareness and on security-related matters. The officers also increased visits to communities to establish relations with local authorities, strengthened coordination of activities with key humanitarian aid agencies and established a liaison mechanism with the national armed forces.

V. EUFOR deployment

48. The deployment of EUFOR has been completed and the force now comprises 3,300 troops, of whom approximately 200 are located in the Central African Republic.

49. During the reporting period, the operational profile and footprint of EUFOR has increased, resulting in a greater awareness concerning security conditions, criminality and banditry incidents within the area of operations. In addition, EUFOR now has a substantial and permanent presence in the Iriba area with the arrival of the Polish contingent. Patrols across the area and high-visibility operations are being carried out.

VI. United Nations-European Union midterm review

50. In its resolution 1778 (2007), the Security Council requested me to report to it, six months after the European Union declared the initial operating capability of EUFOR, on the arrangements for following up the EUFOR presence at the end of its one-year mandate, including a possible United Nations operation. To that end, the Council requested the United Nations and the European Union to perform an evaluation of the needs on the ground. Accordingly, a United Nations-European Union team visited Chad and the Central African Republic from 18 to 24 June. The team consisted of representatives of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, Political Affairs and Safety and Security, as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR, OHCHR, MINURCAT, the European Union, the European Commission and EUFOR.

51. The team consulted closely with the national authorities, the diplomatic community, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations country team and was accompanied in its field trips by a representative of CONAFIT. The team visited Abéché, Farchana, Goz Beida, Iriba and Birao.

A. Key findings in Chad

52. The 290,000 refugees and 180,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad continue to be gravely affected by internal and cross-border hostilities. The security situation has deteriorated in the past six months, seriously undermining the capacity of humanitarian workers to deliver assistance. Carjackings, armed
robberies and crime targeting national and international humanitarian staff continue regularly. So far in 2008, six humanitarian aid workers have been killed and 107 security incidents involving humanitarian workers have been reported. The killing on 14 May of two gendarmes of the National Commission for Aid to Refugees near the Touloum refugee camp underlines the risks incurred by those responsible for securing the areas in and around the camps and escorting humanitarian workers.

53. In the past year, the refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites have become increasingly militarized. Reports of armed men and heavy arms in the camps, as well as recruitment of children and young adults, are a cause of deep concern. Reports have also been received of acts of sexual and gender-based violence and other serious violations of human rights in the refugee camps, internally displaced persons sites and other areas in eastern Chad. The continued erosion of the civilian and humanitarian nature of the camps and sites poses serious protection risks for the people living in and around them.

54. While the midterm review noted that EUFOR was beginning to have a positive effect in deterring security threats, during the team’s visit MINURCAT was still at the early stages of its deployment into eastern Chad and DIS had not yet begun to deploy. Hence, it is not yet possible to fully determine the impact on the security situation of the combined EUFOR, MINURCAT and DIS mandates. In the meantime, however, humanitarian access has decreased as security conditions have forced aid workers to limit operations.

55. A key issue in improving security is impunity for acts of banditry and violations of human rights. While the deployment of DIS and the rule of law programme of MINURCAT and its partners will help strengthen administrative capacity, it is necessary for these efforts to be matched by actions on the part of the Government to act with all transparency in ensuring that crimes are investigated and those found accountable are brought to justice.

56. The voluntary return of internally displaced persons in conditions of safety and security has been undermined by local tensions over scarce resources, which have been manifest in violence among ethnic groups. These tensions are particularly acute in the Dar Sila region.

57. The security of internally displaced persons and vulnerable populations in eastern Chad has also been affected by the activities of armed opposition groups. The intermittent attempts by these groups to attack N’Djamena and their forays into eastern Chad from bases on the Sudanese side of the border have created a general atmosphere of volatility in the area. Some parties have called upon the United Nations to create a border monitoring mechanism to deter the cross-border activities of these groups. After careful assessment, the Secretariat has concluded that monitoring, let alone securing, the border between Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic would be a virtually impossible task. This task would be extremely manpower intensive and there is no guarantee that monitoring cross-border activities in one area would not simply push them to another area. More fundamentally, however, the cross-border concerns of Chad and the Sudan related to support of rebel groups can only be addressed through political dialogue and cooperation.

58. The only sustainable solution to insecurity created by the Chadian armed opposition groups is for these groups to give up their quest to take power by force
and to engage in constructive dialogue with the Government to peacefully address their underlying grievances. Broad and sustained efforts at the national level to establish a more inclusive Government and implement the 13 August 2007 agreement on electoral reforms would also help build the trust necessary for all concerned to constructively engage in peaceful dialogue.

59. The use of Chadian territory as a rear base by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and of Sudanese territory as a rear base by Chadian armed opposition groups has significantly heightened regional tensions. While the risk of direct hostilities between Chad and the Sudan is not deemed to be high, the continued support of these groups undermines the Chadian and Darfurian peace processes and regional peace and security.

B. Key findings in the Central African Republic

60. In the Central African Republic, the mandate provided to EUFOR and MINURCAT under resolution 1778 (2007) was related to the security threat created by a possible spillover of the Darfur conflict and the infiltration into Chad of Chadian armed opposition groups along the Sudan/Central African Republic/Chad axis in the north-eastern part of the country. The United Nations team visited Birao and discussed the security situation with representatives of EUFOR, MINURCAT and the humanitarian community stationed there. The main security threats to the population, including the 3,900 Darfurian refugees and 20,000 internally displaced persons, and to humanitarian workers consist of common and petty crimes, roadblocks and banditry. While it cannot be ruled out that armed elements would cross the Sudanese border into the region, the team did not assess an immediate threat of spillover of the conflict in Darfur into the area. In this context, the current activities of EUFOR include limited patrolling in and around Birao and securing the airstrip.

61. During its visit to Bangui, the United Nations-European Union team met an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister. On that occasion, representatives of the Government requested that the United Nations take over from EUFOR in order to address possible cross-border violence from Darfur.

62. The high level of poverty and unemployment aggravated by arrears in salary payments to civil servants and military personnel, poorly motivated state security forces, banditry, the proliferation of small arms and relative impunity can create a volatile environment and affect the safety and security of United Nations staff throughout the country. The recent increase in support to the Government from BONUCA, UNDP, the Peacebuilding Commission and other donors to strengthen the rule of law, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in the country is a positive development. In this connection, the Department of Political Affairs is leading a United Nations system integrated task force to ensure that United Nations support is as targeted and effective as it can be in meeting the critical peacebuilding needs of the Government.
VII. Expanded MINURCAT presence post-EUFOR

63. In the light of the findings reported above on the continued security threats and risks in eastern Chad, the Secretariat has developed recommendations for an enhanced MINURCAT mandate that would include a military force to take over from EUFOR at the end of its mandate on 15 March 2009, and the use of the Mission’s good offices to assist the Government and relevant stakeholders in addressing the underlying causes of insecurity in eastern Chad related to the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

64. Given the significant capacity-building requirements of the Central African Republic in security sector reform, rule of law and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, I am taking steps to ensure that the support provided by BONUCA, the Peacebuilding Commission and the United Nations system is targeted and effective in meeting the priority needs of the Government. Hence, the enhanced mandate of MINURCAT would concentrate on eastern Chad, with a limited military contingent in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic.

A. Concept of operations

65. The area of operations of the MINURCAT force in eastern Chad would include the Ennedi Est department and the Wadi Fira, Ouaddai and Salamat regions. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and once fully deployed, the force would provide the security necessary to protect civilians at risk, enhance the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of the MINURCAT mandate, and protect United Nations personnel and installations. These objectives would be achieved through a concept of deterrence based on force presence. The force would require specific capabilities and enabling elements to carry out this concept.

66. The impartiality of the force would be fundamental to its success. The force’s impartiality would be exercised through liaison with all armed elements in the subregion, including the armed forces of Chad and any other armed elements with influence in the area of responsibility.

67. In order to provide security, it is essential for the force to enjoy full freedom of movement, including unimpeded access to airfields and roads. The force will also require the full cooperation of local authorities in the deployment of its personnel and contingent-owned equipment, including along its main supply routes in Chad that may be outside the military area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of supply lines. To ensure its freedom of movement, the force would require mobility assets integral to the military component. Owing to the terrain and distances involved, this could only be achieved by a robust military helicopter fleet.

68. The challenging physical environment of the area of responsibility, in particular the scarcity of water resources, would constrain the size of the force and necessitate force multipliers such as aviation assets that cannot, given austere conditions, be replaced by higher troop numbers. An effective force would therefore be reliant on aerial mobility, and the availability of these assets from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) should be considered.
69. The vast size of its area of responsibility and the fluidity of the security environment would also demand that the force have operational and tactical flexibility. Highly mobile and responsive reserves would be critical in this regard. An information, surveillance and reconnaissance capability would also be required to gather situational awareness, demonstrate presence and provide deterrence. Situational awareness would provide the necessary information to deploy the mobile reserves to identified areas of tension and emerging crises. The mobile reserves would also increase the capacity of the force to support specific humanitarian and other protection tasks.

70. Owing to the volatility of the security situation, the force would require an “over the horizon” capability of approximately a battalion group with appropriate support requirements, ready to deploy expeditiously should the security situation rise to levels beyond the capacity of a United Nations force. This would be especially required during the vulnerable period of transition from EUFOR to the United Nations force and before the latter is fully operational.

71. The sustainability of the force will be critical to its effectiveness given the remote and austere conditions in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. In this regard, it will be essential that the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic hand over all EUFOR sites and facilities to the United Nations force. If these sites and all facilities are not handed over to the United Nations well in advance of the transition to a United Nations force, it is estimated that it will take more than one year to establish the sites necessary for United Nations troop reception. Assuming that the United Nations will inherit all EUFOR sites, it will be necessary to expand them and build some additional sites to accommodate the United Nations force. Moreover, infantry battalions would need to be self-sustaining. Sufficient engineering and logistic capabilities will also be required, including light field engineer capacity within each battalion, for the initial 12-month period of its deployment.

72. In order to achieve the required effect, the force should be led by high-quality commanders and provided the necessary capabilities, selected by the United Nations. In this regard, and in accordance with the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), it would be recommended that the Security Council consider leaving in draft form the resolution authorizing the deployment of the force until such time as the Secretariat has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements from Member States.

B. Force requirements

73. The force would be headquartered with a liaison office and small staff in the MINURCAT headquarters in N’Djamena. Military operations would be controlled from a forward headquarters in Abéché within the Mission’s forward headquarters. The force would be structured into three battalion group sectors: north (Iriba, Bahai), centre (Abéché, Farchana) and south (Goz Beida).

74. The force would be structured as an enhanced infantry brigade, including four infantry battalions. A battalion would be deployed to each of the three sectors (total of three deployed battalions). The force reserve would have designated tasks for the conduct of security operations on the main supply routes in Chad. A military air component of 18 utility helicopters and an armed aerial reconnaissance unit would
provide the necessary aviation assets to support the concept. A quick-reaction force would be required at force and sector levels in accordance with normal operating procedures. A force reconnaissance company and military liaison officers would further enhance the Mission’s situational awareness.

75. Military logistic enablers would be based on a centralized concept, with assets controlled at Mission level. A reserve battalion would be based in Abéché and deployable to up to three locations simultaneously, at half-company strength. The force would include centralized logistic and transport units that would deliver support to the sectors. An engineer battalion would also have the capacity to operate in three locations simultaneously. The advantage of centralizing these assets is a lower troop ceiling (an important factor given the water shortage), the allocation of assets to tasks on a Mission priority basis, and easier command and control of the reserve, thus enabling a larger decisive force to be brought to bear on a single crisis.

76. It is assessed that upward of 6,000 United Nations troops would be required to implement this concept in eastern Chad. This figure does not include the “over the horizon” force noted in paragraph 70 above. It should be noted in this regard that, as a bridging operation to a potential United Nations force, the European Union planned to deploy 3,700 troops in addition to logistic and aerial support provided on a bilateral basis. Hence the size of both concepts is very close in number.

77. With regard to the Central African Republic, while the security situation in the EUFOR area of operations is relatively benign, a continued military presence in the north-east could have a positive impact on security by deterring criminal activities and other acts of violence which constitute the greatest threat to civilians in that region. Should the Council authorize such a presence, the United Nations military requirements for this force would have to be further assessed. The troop numbers for this force would be in addition to the requirements noted above for eastern Chad. It should be noted that the support requirements for such a presence would be challenging, given the remoteness of the region and its distance from the remainder of the force. Support to these troops and implementation of their mandated tasks would require a concept based on aviation assets. In the meantime, it would be important to enhance the activities of BONUCA to ensure proper support to the peacebuilding needs of the Central African Republic.

C. Support requirements

78. In planning for MINURCAT to take over from EUFOR, the United Nations will face numerous challenges related to the remoteness of the area, which is sustained through extraordinarily long supply routes with limited transportation resources. The number, capacity and condition of airfields will also limit the capacity for rapid deployment. Owing to the limited availability of potable water, both MINURCAT and EUFOR continue to face considerable challenges in meeting their daily water requirements. These challenges together with the timing and severity of the rainy season will present daunting difficulties for the establishment of the United Nations force and effective handover of responsibilities from EUFOR to the United Nations.

79. As noted above, the most critical factor in the ability of MINURCAT to replace EUFOR in a timely manner will be a binding agreement from the Government of Chad six months before the transfer of authority from EUFOR to the
United Nations that the United Nations will assume ownership of all sites developed by the European Union together with the related infrastructure. During this six-month period, considerable engineering work will be required to expand and upgrade existing EUFOR camps and to construct new camps in areas where EUFOR does not have the necessary infrastructure (primarily in Guéréda and Bahai) so that incoming United Nations troops are operational on the date of transfer of authority. Existing airfields will also need to be improved to deploy and sustain the United Nations force upon transition.

80. Due to the difficult physical, operational and security environment, frequent disruptions of the supply chain are likely. In order to ensure that MINURCAT is able to put all administrative and logistics arrangements in place prior to the arrival of the main components, it would be crucial to deploy the enabling capability such as aviation, medical, engineering and logistics as a first step. These elements would have to be in place before the transfer of authority, although this could be achieved with the re-hatting of existing suitably capable EUFOR troop contributors.

81. An expanded Mission would need to be supported through two main supply routes, namely Douala in Cameroon and Benghazi in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. To ensure the uninterrupted flow of supply and materials, the cooperation of the Governments of Chad, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Cameroon will be critical. The existing MINURCAT logistics base in N’Djamena and forward logistics base in Abéché will be expanded to meet the increase in requirements. Critical contracts, including rations, fuel, camp services and construction services among others, will have to be operational well before the commencement of transition. To ensure a seamless transition, MINURCAT will require continued guaranteed support from the existing EUFOR contracts under the current technical agreement until United Nations contracts are put in place.

D. Détachement intégré de sécurité

82. MINURCAT will continue to support the establishment of DIS. The Government of Chad has requested that the total strength of DIS be raised from 850 to some 1,700 elements. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations will examine this request on the basis of lessons learned and a needs assessment mission after the first elements of DIS have been deployed. It is therefore critical that the presidential decree enabling the deployment of DIS to eastern Chad be issued at the earliest possible date. An expanded area of operations of DIS may necessitate a review of the concept of operations of the proposed United Nations military force in order to ensure that the force has the capability to ensure the security of United Nations police deployed to monitor and provide on-the-job training for DIS elements. It may also necessitate the expanded deployment of human rights, rule of law and civil affairs elements of the Mission. Any additional military, police and civilian personnel requirements would be presented to the Security Council, with the requisite support and financial implications.

E. Peace aspects of the Mission’s mandate

83. The expansion of MINURCAT to include a military component would only be effective if in addition to its present police, rule of law, human rights and civil
affairs mandate, the Mission were mandated to support Chadian stakeholders in addressing underlying causes of insecurity relevant to the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons. In this connection, the technical assessment mission recommended that MINURCAT undertake additional tasks to assist the Government in strengthening mechanisms to ensure a stable and peaceful environment and, in this regard, provide its good offices to:

(a) Support national and local authorities in resolving local tensions to enhance the environment for the return of internally displaced persons;

(b) Support the Government’s efforts to end impunity for crimes against civilians and humanitarian workers;

(c) At the regional level, continue to play a role as observer with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur in the contact group that was established under the 13 March Dakar Accord to monitor its implementation and assist, as necessary, the Governments of Chad and the Sudan in building good neighbourly relations.

84. On 1 and 2 September, I dispatched the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, to Chad and the Central African Republic to discuss the recommendations outlined in the present report with Government officials. Mr. Mulet met with Presidents Deby and Bozizé as well as other senior Government officials. In Chad, President Deby agreed to the deployment of a United Nations follow-on operation, including a military component, to replace EUFOR. The President recognized that further progress was required in the implementation of the 13 August agreement and noted that the European Union and UNDP were assisting the Government to that end. In that regard, President Deby requested that the United Nations follow-on presence remain within the framework provided under Security Council resolution 1778 (2007) to address the spillover of the Darfur crisis and help create conditions conducive to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. President Deby called for greater support for the internally displaced and an increase in the MINURCAT presence at the sites. The President also appealed to the international community to address the causes and consequences of the Darfur crisis.

85. In the Central African Republic, President Bozizé requested that a United Nations military follow-on operation replace EUFOR. The President highlighted the peculiar security situation in the northern part of the country and expressed the view that a United Nations military presence could play a deterrent role and minimize the possibility of a security vacuum that could derail the security sector reform and peace processes.

86. On 3 September, Mr. Mulet met with General Patrick Nash, EUFOR Force Commander, at his base in Paris to report on the results of his visit to Chad and the Central African Republic. Their discussions included the identification of steps required to ensure a transfer of authority on 15 March 2009 with a particular focus on avoiding any security gap in the area of operations.
VIII. Financial implications


88. Should the Security Council approve my recommendation for the establishment of a United Nations military force to take over from EUFOR and an expanded mandate of MINURCAT, it will be my intention to absorb the related resource requirements within the appropriation provided for the Mission by the General Assembly for the 2008/09 period. In the event expenditures incurred by MINURCAT exceed the appropriation, I shall seek from the Assembly additional funding for the Mission in the context of its budget performance report for the 2008/09 period.

89. Information on financial implications for the 12-month period arising from my recommendations will be provided to the Council shortly in an addendum to the present report.

90. As at 30 June 2008, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINURCAT amounted to $45 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,671.4 million.

IX. Observations and recommendations

91. The underlying causes of insecurity and instability in Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion are complex. Regional and local tensions, poverty, weak institutions and poor infrastructure compound the difficulties faced by local authorities in finding peaceful and sustainable mechanisms to address the causes and consequences of insecurity and violence. Nevertheless, there has been some progress during the reporting period in consolidating peace and stability in Chad and the Central Africa Republic and I commend the leaders of these countries for their efforts in this regard.

92. The Government of Chad should continue to take bold and decisive steps to bring immediate protection to civilians at risk, end any support provided on its territory to JEM, and offer the armed opposition a viable mechanism to address their grievances without resort to arms. While the rule of law and human rights programmes of MINURCAT and its partners can help to build the necessary judicial capacity, the Government must show the political will necessary to stop impunity and take immediate and concrete steps to investigate crimes and bring perpetrators to justice. Such steps would go a long way in increasing confidence in the Government’s determination to provide security for its people and ensure transparent governance.

93. The Government of the Sudan should also continue to show good will in normalizing relations with Chad and take steps to stop any support provided to Chadian armed opposition groups on its territory. Both Governments must enter into a meaningful dialogue on how they can together stop illegal cross-border activities. MINURCAT and the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur stand ready to assist the Governments in this regard. Improved relations between
Chad and the Sudan will contribute to creating a safe and secure environment for the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT.

94. I commend the efforts of the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to assist Chadian stakeholders in finding a peaceful means to end the internal armed conflict with armed opposition groups. MINURCAT stands ready to help all stakeholders to ensure that these efforts are inclusive of all parties and that agreements reached are sustained and implemented on the ground.

95. In accordance with the findings and recommendations outlined in the present report, particularly paragraphs 73 to 77 and 83, I recommend that the Security Council consider the establishment, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, of a United Nations military force of up to 6,000 troops and logistic enablers to take over from EUFOR. I also call upon Member States with the necessary capabilities to work with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in establishing an “over the horizon” stand-by presence with appropriate support capability that could be deployed expeditiously to back up the implementation of the Mission’s mandate should the security situation rise to levels beyond that of the capabilities of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. I recommend, in accordance with the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), that the Security Council consider leaving in draft form the resolution authorizing the deployment of the force until such time as the Secretariat has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements from Member States. In the meantime, the United Nations would explore with the European Union the possibility of a limited extension of the EUFOR presence to cover any potential gap between the end of the EUFOR mandate and the arrival of the new United Nations force in theatre, should the United Nations face force generation difficulties. The Secretariat will dispatch a team of experts to Brussels and Paris in the coming days to discuss the modalities of transition planning with the European Union and EUFOR counterparts.

96. I firmly believe that an expanded United Nations presence with a military component would best support the protection and return of refugees and internally displaced persons if MINURCAT strengthened its engagement with all actors involved in supporting related aspects of the peacebuilding process in Chad. This engagement would ensure that the activities of MINURCAT contribute to a comprehensive effort to end insecurity and support the voluntary, secure and sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

97. In regard to the Central African Republic, I believe that the United Nations and donors should consolidate and focus their support in coordination with BONUCA and the Peacebuilding Commission in helping the Government to build its capacity to provide security and basic services for its people, particularly through support for security sector reform, the rule of law and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements, and extension of State services.

98. Should the Security Council decide that the post-EUFOR United Nations military force under the MINURCAT mandate should have a presence in the northeastern Central Africa Republic, the Secretariat would have to reassess the security, protection, support and financial implications of such a force. Any recommendations would be provided to the Security Council at a later date.

99. The deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR and the establishment of DIS in Chad, as well as the deployment of FOMUC and more recently MICOPAX in the
Central African Republic, have been significant steps in helping the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to bring sustainable peace and economic development to their people. The United Nations-European Union-DIS multidimensional presence has been a new experience in peacekeeping. I would like to commend the European Union and the EUFOR troop-contributing States for their efforts in establishing security in the subregion. Collaboration between the United Nations and the European Union has been exemplary. I would also like to thank my Special Representatives for MINURCAT and BONUCA, Victor Angelo and François Fall, and all the men and women of MINURCAT and BONUCA for their untiring efforts and dedication in working for peace and security in the subregion.